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I. THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
One hundred twenty-five years ago, the Reconstruction Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution were beginning to take their final
shape. In his inaugural address delivered on March 4, 1861, President
Lincoln stated that he would not oppose an amendment to the Constitu-
tion, "to the effect that the federal government, shall never interfere with
the domestic institutions of the States, including that of persons held to
service."1 The compromise that Lincoln discussed did not become the
Thirteenth Amendment. The Civil War began only a few weeks later,
forever ending Northern attempts to accommodate the South in a way
that would preserve the institution of slavery and the Union. The Presi-
dent issued his final Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.2
Congress debated the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution in the
spring of 1864 and the winter of the following year.3 Ratified in 1865,
the amendment provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles;
B.A., 1981, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1984, Harvard University.
1. Abraham Lincoln, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859-1865, at 222 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
2. Abraham Lincoln, Final Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS: 1859-1865, supra note 1, at 424.
3. The history of the three Reconstruction Amendments is recounted in DANIEL A. FAR-
BER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 247-345 (1990).
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duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject
to their jurisdiction."4
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution grew out of the
conflict between the Reconstruction Congress and President Andrew
Johnson. On March 27, 1866, President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights
bill, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race. Congress over-
rode his veto on April 9, and twelve days later an amendment to the
Constitution was placed before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction.
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868; Section 1 provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'
Both the House and the Senate debated resolutions prohibiting de-
nial of the right to vote on the basis of race in January 1869. The Fif-
teenth Amendment was ratified in 1870. It provides: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."6 After the ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, the Constitution was not amended again until 1913.
II. HISTORY AND THE SYMPOSIUM
Together, the three Reconstruction Amendments represent a crucial
episode in our constitutional history. The five essays in this Symposium
relate the history of the Reconstruction Amendments to contemporary
constitutional practice. Erwin Chemerinsky's essay, The Supreme Court
and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise,7 recounts the
wrong turns and missed opportunities that mark the history of judicial
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Chemerinsky
argues that cramped judicial construction has left the promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment unfulfilled. From the burial of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in the Slaughter-House Cases I to the use of rational
basis scrutiny to uphold discrimination on the basis of age and wealth,
Professor Chemerinsky contends that the Supreme Court has drastically
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
7. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Unful-
filled Promise, 25 LoY. L.A. L. Rv. 1143 (1992).
8. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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and erroneously limited the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
majestic provisions.
Michael McConnell's essay, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second
American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition,9 ex-
plores the relationship between the Constitution of the founding period
and the Reconstruction Amendments. Professor McConnell argues that
the Reconstruction Amendments did not represent a sharp break from
the principles eminent in the original Constitution. Rather, the amend-
ments should be viewed as a reaffirmation and restoration of old constitu-
tional values.
In his essay, The Role of History in Interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment,10 William Nelson explicitly addresses the question of
whether recourse to history should guide the courts when they interpret
the Fourteenth Amendment. Professor Nelson argues that the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment sought both to protect fundamental
human rights and to preserve local self-rule. The tension between these
two goals became apparent when the Supreme Court attempted to apply
the Fourteenth's sweeping provisions to actual cases. As a consequence,
neither the text of the amendment nor the original intentions of its fram-
ers provide a reliable guide for interpretation. Instead, the courts must
look to contemporary values for application of the amendment to today's
confficts.
David Richards's essay, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional
Theory and the Reconstruction Amendments,"l investigates the role of ab-
olitionist political theory in the framing of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. The radical antislavery view, that slavery was antithetical to the
underlying principles of the original Constitution, moved from the mar-
gins of constitutional interpretation to the center of the political stage.
Professor Richards urges contemporary constitutional theorists to pay
heed to the radical antislavery thesis that the robust protection of human
rights is a prerequisite to acceptance of the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land.
Mark Tushnet's essay, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of
the Reconstruction Amendments, 2 challenges us to question our assump-
9. Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution
or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1159 (1992).
10. William E. Nelson, The Role of History in Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, 25
Loy. L.A. L. RaV. 1177 (1992).
11. David A.J. Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the Recon-
struction Amendments, 25 LoY. L.A. L. Rav. 1187 (1992).
12. Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 1207 (1992).
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tions about the future of the Fourteenth Amendment by reminding our-
selves about its past. Professor Tushnet contends that Reconstruction
era legal thinkers drew sharp distinctions between three categories of
rights-civil, political and social. The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that it would protect civil rights, such as the right
to contract, but would not interfere with state regulation of political
rights, such as the right to serve on a jury. In the modem era, the line
between civil and political rights has eroded, but the line between civil
and social rights, such as the right to adequate housing, remains bright.
Professor Tushnet argues that the dramatic difference between the line-
drawing practices of Reconstruction era thinkers and contemporary cate-
gorizations may well prefigure further conceptual change. In the future,
judicial enforcement of social rights may seem as natural as does judicial
enforcement of political rights today.
III. HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The essays that comprise this Symposium display a wide range of
attitudes toward the role of history in constitutional interpretation.
Michael McConnell and David Richards believe that important lessons
can be learned from the political theory that shaped the framing of the
Reconstruction Amendments. William Nelson cautions against reliance
on the original intentions of the framers. Erwin Chemerinsky sees the
history of the judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
betrayal of the original aspirations it embodies. For Mark Tushnet, the
gap between our views and those of Reconstruction era thinkers serves to
remind us of the contingency of our own constitutional concepts.
The different stances toward history by the Symposium authors re-
flect a debate over the relationship between history and constitutional
interpretation.13 Participants in the debate have included judges, consti-
13. See, ag., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA
(1990); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 33-57 (1985); William Brennan, The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433 (1986);
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1085 (1989); Richard Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The
Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 43 (1987); Stephen
R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does Our Constitution Mean What it Always Meant?, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985); Larry Simon, The Authority
of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist Interpretation Be Justfied?, 73 CAL. L.
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tutional scholars and legal philosophers. The focus of the debate has
been on a theory of constitutional interpretation that is usually labeled
"originalism." There are several strands of originalism, but they share a
core belief that the meaning of a constitutional provision for its framers
and ratifiers should have great weight in judicial interpretation. For
most originalists, the "original intentions of the framers" are the guide to
original meaning. Some originalists believe that the intentions that count
are the general principles affirmed by the framers. Others believe that
intentions about particular policies or practices are binding. Many pro-
ponents of originalism contend that deference to the intentions of the
framers is required by democratic theory.
Originalism has been criticized in a number of ways. One line of
criticism has focused on the coherence of the idea that there is anything
that should be called the "original meaning" of the Constitution. A sec-
ond line of criticism attacks the notion that contemporary judges should
defer to the opinions or intentions of framers who lived long ago, under
conditions that are very different from the contemporary situation.
It is difficult to say whether the debate over originalism has resulted
in any convergence of views about the proper relevance of history to con-
stitutional interpretation. On the one hand, the recent appointments of
conservatives to the Supreme Court could lead to the increasing use of
originalist premises in the opinions of the Justices. On the other hand,
the academic debate is thought by many constitutional scholars to have
resulted in a thorough trouncing of originalism as a constitutional
theory.
One reaction to the originalism debate has been to deny the in-
dependent normative force of history for current constitutional practice.
For example, Samuel Freeman has written:
Appeals to original meanings serve as an adjudicative device-
one among many employed by the Court-used in this case to
provide confirming evidence for decisions reached on the basis
of independent principles, and show the continuity of the con-
stitution over time. Framers' intent is then standardly invoked
as the result of a conclusion of analysis; it is not a principle
providing independent and sufficient reasons of its own.
14
REv. 1482 (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique oflnterpretiv-
ism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. Rnv. 781 (1983).
14. Samuel Freeman, Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution,
21 PHIL. & PUB. Ars. 3, 19 (1992). Freeman's article provides an important and original
analysis of the implications of the originalism debate for democratic theory.
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Even if one rejects originalism as a theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion, Freeman's point does not seem quite right. Framers' intentions
may not settle constitutional questions, but this does not imply that they
lack normative force. Courts take history seriously. The fact that the
framers, advocates or ratifiers of a constitutional provision believed in a
principle is not mere window dressing, to be added to an opinion after
the work of decision is done. For example, the voices of Hamilton, Jay
and Madison, as the authors of the Federalist Papers, speak to us with
authority when we inquire into the meaning of the original Constitution.
Abolitionist theories of human rights have moral force that cannot be
disregarded when we interpret the Reconstruction Amendments.
Moreover, the normative force of history is not limited to "the rea-
sons the founders had for their intentions."15 Consider the following
thought experiment. Suppose the Federalist Papers had been written for
another nation with a similar constitution, say Barbados. In this alter-
nate past, the arguments made in the Barbados Federalist Papers are es-
sentially the same, although the historical details are different. The
Barbados Federalist Papers would speak to us with the force of the rea-
sons provided, but only with that force. They would not speak with the
authority that Hamilton, Jay and Madison have because of their special
role in our constitutional tradition. It is unlikely that the Barbados Fed-
eralist Papers would be cited with frequency in the judicial opinions of
the courts of the United States. Our judges would feel no special obliga-
tion to provide compelling reasons when their interpretation of our Con-
stitution ran counter to arguments found in the foreign Federalist. The
point of the thought experiment is this: the normative force of our his-
tory for our current practice, including the writings of the framers, can-
not be reduced to the normative force of the arguments found in that
history. 16
Finally, the normative force of our history is not based on mere prej-
udice or superstition or ancestor worship. We pay special attention to
the opinions of the framers because those opinions have had a crucial
formative influence on who we are, on what we believe and on how we
think. History is important because it enables us to understand our-
15. Id. at 19 n.29. Freeman's conclusion that the reasons behind the framers' intentions
provide the "ultimate justification," id., in judicial decisions that rely upon them is correct in
the sense that we must be persuaded by the framers before we agree with them. My point is
that the framers' special role in our history gives their opinions independent persuasive force.
16. There is an important question as to what the normative force of original meanings is
and should be. At the very least, original meanings and principles endorsed by the framers and
ratifiers are entitled to some presumptive weight. Accordingly, we do not interpret the Consti-
tution in a way that departs from ascertainable original meaning without good reason.
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selves. As an illustration of this final point, I offer the following constitu-
tional fable-an allegorical meditation on the meaning of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
IV. A CONSTITUTIONAL FABLE
Once upon a time, an airplane flew over the land of the Nonos, a
people who kept to themselves and did not permit outsiders to interfere
with their ancient traditions.7 From the belly of the plane, a paper fell
and fluttered until it landed in the lap of the Chief Woman of the Nonos.
The paper had writing in English on it. Long ago, the Nonos had
learned the writing of a strange people who called themselves the Eng-
lish. The Nonos had not heard anything of the English for a very long
time, but educated Nonos still knew how to read their writing. A Nono
elder read the paper to the people, translating as she went along. It be-
gan, "We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more per-
fect Union,... do hereby ordain and establish this Constitution."
"This is a sign from the Heavens," the Chief Woman exclaimed.
"This constitution is a plan for us from the Goddesses." The wise per-
sons of the Nonos agreed, and so the Nonos began to follow their new
plan. The assembly of the representatives of the Nono clans became a
Congress, and the Council of the Wise became the Supreme Court. The
Chief Woman became the President. "You see," she explained to a
group of Nono youngsters, "the Goddesses approve of our rule that only
an older and wiser woman can become the President. They tell us that
she must be at least 35 years of age." The Constitution included some
provisions that made a lot of sense to the Nonos, such as age limits for
important positions. Other provisions were so mysterious to the Nonos
that they were entirely ignored. For example, the various literal transla-
tions for "State" made no sense at all, so the assumption was made that
the "States" were family clans.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution were quite curious to the Nonos. Most of the provisions seemed
so obvious. Who needs to be reminded that slavery is a bad idea? None-
theless, parts of the Fourteenth Amendment were of profound impor-
tance. Some clans were shocked by the provision reading, "But when the
right to vote.., is denied to any of the male inhabitants ... the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in proportion." One respected
elder asked, "How can the Goddesses think that all men should be al-
17. Another fable about the Nonos is found in Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Trans-
formative Politics, 63 TUL. L. Rav. 1599, 1604-05 (1989).
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lowed to vote at age 21? Men aren't mature until they are much older."
Other members of the tribe pointed out the cleverness of the Goddesses
in providing clans an incentive to change their attitudes toward men. A
wise woman observed, "The Fourteenth Amendment allows a clan to
deny young men the vote if they wish, but the clan must pay the price of
reduced representation in the tribal Congress."
The Nonos were also profoundly impressed by Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. They had recently been experiencing some dif-
ficulties with the tribal budget. Deficit spending had been going on for
quite some time, and many Nonos were loudly complaining about fiscal
mismanagement. "The Fourteenth Amendment is a sign from the God-
desses that this criticism must stop," the Chief Woman announced, "It
says right here in black and white, 'The validity of the public debt of the
United States... shall not be questioned.' The First Amendment guar-
antees the freedom of speech, but the Fourteenth makes it clear that
pointless bickering about the tribe's debts is outside of that freedom."
The Nonos, you see, were nonoriginalists. They did not have the
option of interpreting the Constitution in light of the intentions of its
framers. Although they knew English, they knew nothing of American
history, nothing of the Revolutionary War, nothing of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, and nothing of the Great Depression. But we cannot
choose to be like the Nonos. Our assumptions, our prejudices, the ques-
tions we think are relevant, the questions we do not bother to ask-all
are the product of our history. The Reconstruction Amendments cannot
mean for us what they would mean for true nonoriginalists. As the es-
says that follow show, we cannot escape the history that shapes our un-
derstanding of the Constitution.
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